Signaling Competence In Elections


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Summary

著者
Takakazu Honryo
シリーズ
MQ Discussion Series
DP番号
2014-007
公開年月
May, 2014
言語
英語
URL
ファイル
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Summary
We analyze how political candidates can signal their competence and show that polarization might be a way of doing this. For this purpose, we study a unidimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition in which a fraction of candidates have the ability to correctly observe a policy-relevant state of the world. We show that candidates tend to polarize, even in the absence of policy bias. This is because proposing an extreme platform has a competence signaling effect and has a strictly higher probability of winning than proposing a median platform. The degree of polarization depends on how uncertain is the state of the world.

 
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