Using a simple framework of Cooper and John (1988) and Cooper (1999), this paper derives the conditions under which overconfidence and underconfidence of agents lead to Pareto improvement. We show that an agent’s overconfidence in a game exhibiting strategic complementarity and positive spillovers and an agent’s underconfidence in a game exhibiting strategic complementarity and negative spillovers can lead to Pareto improvement.
This paper explores the role of consumption externalities in a neoclassical growth model in which households have heterogeneous preferences. We find that the degree of conformism in consumption held by each household significantly affects the speed of convergence of the aggregate economy as well as the patterns of wealth distribution in the steady state equilibrium. In particular, a higher degree of consumption conformism accelerates the convergence speed of the economy towards the steady state. We also reveal that in an economy with a high degree of conformism, the pattern of initial distribution of wealth tends not to be sustained in the long run.
This paper explores the relation between capital accumulation and transformation of industrial structure in a small open-economy. Using a three-sector, neoclassical growth model with non-homothetic preferences, we examine dynamic behavior of the small country in the alternative trade regimes. We show that capital accumulation plays a leading role in the process of structural transformation. It is also revealed that the trade pattern significantly affects structural change. We demonstrate that our model can mimic a typical pattern of change in industrial structure that has been observed in many developed economies.
